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Many species are sexually dimorphic, and interestingly, males in some species are 18 
dimorphic themselves:  some males develop weapons and ornaments, whereas other males 19 
express rudimentary ornaments or none at all: horned beetles (Douglas J Emlen, Lavine, & 20 
Ewen-Campen, 2007; Moczek & Emlen, 2000), bluegill sunfish (Dominey, 1980; Gross & 21 
Charnov, 1980), ruffs (Lank, Smith, Hanotte, Burke, & Cooke, 1995), see for review 22 
(Simpson, Sword, & Lo, 2011). Males in some species are so extremely dimorphic that the 23 
morphs have been misclassified as different species. The selective maintenance of such male 24 
dimorphisms has been difficult to understand (Simpson et al., 2011). Yet, a recent paper by 25 
Clifton and colleagues (2016) concluded the evolution of male dimorphisms can be explained 26 
solely by the handicap principle (Zahavi, 1975). It is not intuitively obvious how the handicap 27 
principle can selectively maintain male dimorphisms, and no verbal explanations were 28 
provided. Here, we raise several caveats about this recent study and in particular we show that 29 
the findings are not generated by the handicap principle, but by an unrelated assumption of 30 
the model. This assumption is not unreasonable, but its stability needs to be examined before 31 
concluding that it provides an explanation for the evolution of male dimorphisms.  32 
There are many versions and interpretations of the handicap hypothesis, but it is 33 
unclear which version was implemented for the authors’ new model. This omission makes it 34 
impossible to understand the novelty of the model and how it succeeds in explaining male 35 
dimorphisms or why others failed. The authors cite the original handicap hypothesis (Zahavi 36 
1975), and yet this version does not work (reviewed in Kirkpatrick 1986). They also cite 37 
evidence consistent with subsequent versions of the handicap hypothesis, but do not 38 
acknowledge that there are many models (Hurd, 1995; Lachmann, Számado, & Bergstrom, 39 
2001; S. Számadó, 1999, 2011) and empirical studies (Kotiaho, 2001; Moreno-Rueda, 2007) 40 
that do not provide support (Számadó and Penn, 2015). The version that is usually cited as 41 
providing theoretical support is the ‘strategic handicap’ model (Zahavi 1977; (Grafen, 1990). 42 
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Grafen (1990) concluded that costly ornaments provide honest indicators of male quality 43 
when the fitness costs of signalling are greater for low than high quality individuals. The three 44 
main conditions in Grafen’s model correspond to the main assumptions of the authors’ model: 45 
(i) ornament size is an honest signal of health, as it is assumed that optimal ornament size is 46 
an increasing function of health; (ii) increasing ornament size is costly; and (iii) healthier 47 
individuals can better afford the costs of producing larger ornaments (i.e. differential cost 48 
assumption). The authors did not claim to base their model on Grafen’s version, and instead 49 
used their own particular interpretation of Zahavi’s (1975) handicap principle (S. Clifton, 50 
person. comm.). This is understandable given the limitations of Grafen’s model (Thomas 51 
Getty, 1998; T. Getty, 2006; Hurd, 1995; Lachmann et al., 2001; S. Számadó, 1999, 2011; see 52 
Szabolcs Számadó & Penn, 2015 for a recent overview and discussion). However, there is a 53 
crucial and unstated difference between these models, and particularly the shape of the benefit 54 
function used in Grafen’s (1990) versus the authors’ model. Here we show that the results of 55 
the authors’ model are due to the shape of the benefit function, which is not part of any 56 
versions of the handicap hypothesis to our knowledge. This means that either the results of the 57 
authors’ new model are not driven the handicap hypothesis, or the authors are proposing a 58 
novel version of the handicap hypothesis. 59 
 The critical assumption that drives the results of the authors’ model is the shape of the 60 
benefits function, and therefore, we examined this assumption (see Box 1 for a description of 61 
the main details of the authors’ model). For simplicity, we consider the difference between the 62 
fitness at the optimal ornament size, given by the “individual reproductive potential” (φ(ind)) 63 
function, and the fitness of the actual ornament size, to be the cost function (c) of signaling, 64 
since it provides the cost of deviating from the individual optimum. The study also applies 65 
Grafen’s condition to this function (i.e., cost and differential cost). We consider the “the 66 
social reproductive potential” (φ(soc)) in the model to be the benefit function (b), since this 67 
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function provides the benefit (reproductive success) of the enlarged ornament. The study sets 68 
up two conditions (see section (b) Generality) for the emergence of two or more morphs:  the 69 
first condition specifies that “Individual effects dominate reproductive potential for large 70 
ornament sizes” (“condition (i)”, pp. 5), and the second specifies that “Social effects dominate 71 
reproductive potential for at least some range of ornament sizes greater than the population 72 
mean” (“condition (ii)”, pp. 5). Together, these conditions imply that there must be an 73 
inflection point, where the function switches from convex to concave, or vice versa, in either 74 
the cost or in the benefit function. Without an inflection point, either the first or second 75 
conditions are satisfied but not both. Yet, neither Grafen’s (1990) model, nor any other 76 
versions of the handicap hypothesis, include any such inflection point, and therefore cannot 77 
explain the results.  78 
The inflection point is introduced in the benefit function of the authors’ model, and the 79 
numerical example presented in the paper clearly shows that the handicap hypothesis does not 80 
explain the results (see Figure 1.a). This inflection point in the benefit function arises entirely 81 
from the assumption in the model that the fitness of an individual depends on the population 82 
average ("playing-the-field” model, Maynard Smith, 1982, pp. 23), rather than one or a series 83 
of individual opponents, as with other ESS models. The bimodal fitness curves, and hence the 84 
bimodal distribution of ornament size, are the result of this inflection point. If the benefit 85 
function has no inflection point and the cost function – that follows the assumptions of the 86 
Zahavi/Grafen handicap hypothesis – is not changed, then there is no such effect. These 87 
arguments can be illustrated by numerical examples (see Fig.1). We used the same cost 88 
function from the authors’ study, but then also introduced a benefit functions that lacks an 89 
inflection point, though otherwise behaves exactly as the benefit function in the study (i.e., 90 
monotonically increasing with ornament size and a zero value at the population average). We 91 
investigate three different general types:  a convex, a linear and a concave function. Figure 1 92 
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shows the results for different gammas (γ), which describe the ‘social sensitivity’ or the 93 
strength of sexual selection. It is clear that the new fitness functions have only one optimum, 94 
even though the cost function remained unchanged and Grafen’s (1990) second and third 95 
conditions (cost and differential cost) still hold. We do not assume that the benefit functions 96 
used in these three examples are realistic, but they show that Grafen’s handicap conditions are 97 
not sufficient to explain the observed bimodal fitness curves in this new model. All in all, the 98 
playing-the-field assumption in the authors’ model is reasonable, but it is not part any version 99 
of the handicap hypothesis to our knowledge. 100 
Finally, regardless of the relevance of the handicap hypothesis, it is unclear that the 101 
authors’ model provides a general explanation for the evolution of dimorphic male ornaments. 102 
First, closer examination indicates that the bimodal fitness function is typical only in a narrow 103 
range of conditions (what the authors refer to as health, h). Figure 2 shows the fitness as 104 
function of ornament size for various health values. It is clear from this figure that bimodality 105 
is observed in only a few cases. The effect is more pronounced for γ values <1 (see Figure 2.b 106 
γ=0.5), and the effect is almost negligible for γ values larger than one (see Figure 2.c).  Figure 107 
2.d shows an enlarged section from Figure 2.c to illustrate the effect more clearly, and that the 108 
result holds for only a narrow range of health values (~ 1.9). Note that the scale on x-axis is 109 
not indicated on Figure 2.c or 2.d in the original study (pp. 2).  110 
Second, the evolutionary stability of the signalling equilibrium proposed in this new 111 
model was not investigated, but seems doubtful. The paper proposes a novel type of signalling 112 
equilibrium, in which signallers of the same type can send more than one signal, and yet the 113 
receiver response to this signalling strategy was not investigated. It is simply assumed to be 114 
evolutionarily stable. However, at any stable evolutionarily equilibrium, the signaller’s 115 
strategy must be best response to the receiver’s strategy – and vice versa (C. Bergstrom, 116 
Szamado, & Lachmann, 2002). Without this crucial step, signalling models are incomplete at 117 
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best and potentially misleading. The approach used in constructing this new model appears to 118 
be based on calculating a “signalling equilibrium” by searching only for the optimal signal 119 
intensity for signallers and keeping the receivers’ evolutionary response fixed. Here we 120 
explore why the current shape of the receiver’s response may not be the best response to the 121 
signaller strategy described in the Clifton et al (2016) model. The authors argue that 122 
communication is “mostly honest, at least for large enough variance in health.” This 123 
conclusion might apply to certain scenarios: (i) the receiver can discriminate all signals, and 124 
thus it can effectively assess the quality of the signaller. If so, it should give the same 125 
response, as dictated by the receiver’s optimum allocation, to the two morphs that belongs to 126 
the same health. In turn, this implies that one of these signals is redundant (the costlier one), 127 
and thus it will be selected against, hence the scenario is not evolutionarily stable. (ii) The 128 
other scenario is that some of the signals cannot be differentiated from signals used by other 129 
types. Receivers in such situations are expected to react to the average type expected (C. T. 130 
Bergstrom & Lachmann, 1998), and thus they will allocate resources accordingly. If so, the 131 
morph with lower signal cost will have higher fitness and the other signal will be selected 132 
against, and such scenario is not expected to be evolutionarily stable. Thus, it is unclear that 133 
the receiver strategy assumed by the authors is the best response to the signaller strategy 134 
obtained in the authors’ model, and making conclusions about the evolutionary stability of 135 
this model crucially require investigating the co-evolutionary response of receivers.  136 
In summary, the model proposed by Clifton and colleagues (2016) to explain male 137 
dimorphisms is interesting, but there are several caveats that should be considered. First, there 138 
are many versions of the handicap hypothesis, but the authors did not clarify which one was 139 
the basis of their model – nor acknowledge the limitations of the relevant version that has 140 
theoretical support (i.e., the Zahavi-Grafen version).  Second, the results of the authors’ model 141 
do not arise from handicap hypothesis per se, but from an inflection in the benefit function 142 
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that emerges from the “playing-the-field” assumption. The conclusion of the paper 143 
(“Handicap principle implies emergence of dimorphic ornaments”) is therefore misleading – 144 
or at least it requires a new version or reinterpretation of the handicap hypothesis. Third, the 145 
“playing-the-field” assumption is a reasonable, but the generality of the results appear rather 146 
limited (since bimodality is generated only in a narrow range of parameters for gamma values 147 
>1). Such limitations could be useful if they provided predictions for the conditions in which 148 
male dimorphisms are expected evolve (e.g. see D. J. Emlen, Hunt, & Simmons, 2005; 149 
Tomkins & Brown, 2004), but we could not detect any such predictions. Also, the conclusions 150 
about evolutionary stability of this model are premature until the co-evolution of the 151 
receivers’ responses are investigated, and the evolutionary stability of the receiver strategy in 152 
this model is doubtful. We applaud the authors for the novelty of their approach to address 153 
this difficult problem, but this new model is unlikely to provide a general explanation for 154 
male dimorphism, at least in its current form. There are other viable hypotheses to explain 155 
dimorphic male phenotypes, including ‘mimicry, sneaking, and fighting,’ as the authors 156 
acknowledged, and these deserve more attention. 157 
 158 
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Box. 1 A description of the model by Clifton et al (2016). 219 
Clifton et al (2016) model the change in the distribution of male ornament size due to 220 
selection on the differential fitness effect of ornaments with different sizes. The fitness of 221 
individuals is influenced by the cost of the ornaments (called ‘individual reproductive 222 
potential’, φ(ind)) and by the reproductive benefits of the ornament (called ‘social reproductive 223 
potential’, φ(soc)). The overall fitness is a weighted sum of these two factors: 224 
        aaaasaasass optindsoc   sgn121 )()(  Eq.1 225 
Where a denotes ornament size, s is the relative importance of ‘social effects’ vs. ‘individual 226 
effects’, finally, gamma (γ) describes the sensitivity of the ‘social reproductive potential’ to 227 
deviations from the population mean. Accordingly, the first part of Eq.1 gives the value of 228 
‘social reproductive potential’ and the second part of the equation is the ‘individual 229 
reproductive potential’.  230 
  231 
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Figure Legends 232 
Figure 1 shows fitness curves with three different benefit functions (concave, linear and 233 
convex respectively), while keeping the same cost function from the original paper with 234 
Grafen’s handicap conditions. Inlets show the benefit functions (the social reproductive 235 
potential, φ(soc)), where: (a) φ(soc)=1- e(-aγ) – (1- e(-āγ)), ā=2; (b) φ(soc)=aγ – āγ, ā=2; (c) φ(soc)=e(a-236 
ω)γ – e(ā-ω)γ, ω=5, ā=2; 237 
Figure 2 shows (a) the original benefit function (the social reproductive potential, φ(soc)), and 238 
the fitness curves for different values of gamma, as a function of ornament size (a), assuming 239 
an average ornament size ā=2: (b) γ=0.5, (c) γ =1.5, and (d) γ =1.5, enlarged section of (b).  240 
  241 
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Figure 1. 242 
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Figure 2. 245 
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